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WHAT SHOULD WE KNOW ABOUT POLITICIANS’ 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION NEED AND USE? 
Labinot Demaj and Lukas Summermatter 
ABSTRACT 
The question of legislators’ use of performance information is crucial, since – among 
others purposes – data on outputs and outcomes is meant to inform about the perfor-
mance of public managers, programs as well as organizations, and ultimately to influ-
ence the allocation of financial means. Limited empirical evidence on parliamentarians’ 
performance information behavior provides contradictory findings with respect to the 
extent to which this new kind of data is used. This paper aims to draw an outline of the 
insights we have about politicians’ information need and use in general. It sets a par-
ticular focus on the question of how the use of performance information by politicians 
could be analyzed more systematically in the future by referring to conceptual treat-
ments of earlier periods or allied disciplines. We show how future research could profit 
by shifting the focus of analysis from the isolated analysis of performance information 
to the context-bounded politician and her information needs, by considering the politi-
cal rationale with respect to the information-decision nexus, and by including possibili-
ties of symbolic or strategic types of performance information utilization. Conceiving 
politicians as need-driven and goal-oriented information users requires a different defi-
nition of what data inform about performance. 
Keywords - Information Needs, Information Use, Performance Information, Policy Po-
sitions, Politicians 
INTRODUCTION 
We do not know much about how and to which extent politicians of the legislative 
branch of government use the information supplied to them by public administration – 
especially those concerning the performance of public agencies and programs (Pollitt, 
2006a, p. 42ff). Although rarely based on a systematic analysis of parliamentary use, the 
majority of existing surveys and meta-inquiries suggests that performance information 
is rarely used by legislators (Ho & Coates, 2004, p. 31; see also Joyce, 1993, p. 14ff; 
Julnes & Holzer, 2001, p. 694; Matheson & Kwon, 2003, p. 14; Poister & Streib, 1999, 
p. 331f; Pollitt, 2008; Raudla, 2012, p. 2). This conclusion exists alongside a few stud-
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ies that have been able to evidence that there are occasions where legislators do actually 
use performance information (Askim, 2007, 2009; Askim & Hanssen, 2008; ter Bogt, 
2001, 2003, 2004). 
The roots of these contradictory findings are worth exploring, since it is a fundamental 
prerequisite of the modern public management conception that politicians use available 
information. From this perspective, information supply serves as the service in return 
for politicians allowing administration to assume operational decision-making authority. 
On the one hand, politicians must ‘see’ how public services are produced, how they 
contribute to the achievement of a desired outcome, and what the costs of production 
are. On the other hand, given this information, politicians’ capacity to steer administra-
tive action shall be recovered, since the new information systems causally link relevant 
aspects with each other and, ideally, enable its users to evaluate expectable consequenc-
es of particular interventions (Bawden, 2006, p. 15; Schedler, 2003, p. 45f). 
Christopher Pollitt calls it “mildly amazing” that, while we have amassed many studies 
of how managers and professionals use or fail to use performance information, we still 
have only a few analyses of what the ultimate users, elected politicians, do with all the 
material now thrust upon them. “Prejudices, dreams and stereotypes” of how politicians 
react to carefully-crafted performance data do exist on both sides of the Atlantic, but 
hardly any studies that address this empirical question and provide answers whose “sig-
nificance in a democratic context can hardly be exaggerated” (Pollitt, 2006b, p. 76f). 
Based on a review of existing works, this paper aims to draw an outline of the insights 
we have about politicians’ information need and use in general. It sets a particular focus 
on the question of how the use of performance information by politicians could be ana-
lyzed more systematically in the future by referring to conceptual treatments of earlier 
periods or allied disciplines of policy and information science. For this purpose and as a 
working definition the concept of ‘information’ is conceived as “any difference a person 
perceives in her environment or within herself and encompasses any aspect that she 
notices in the pattern of reality” (Case, 2008, p. 5). ‘Performance information’ on the 
other hand conventionally describes systematic information about inputs, throughputs, 
outputs and outcomes as well as about relationships among these dimensions of public 
programs as well as organizations, whether intended or not, and generated by systems 
and processes conceived to produce such information (e.g., Pollitt, 2006a, p. 39; Siegel 
& Summermatter, 2008).1 
The relevant body of literature for the review was assembled by an extensive research of 
scientific databases.2 A search for publications containing ‘information’ in the title field 
and within the subject areas of ‘Political Science’ and ‘Public Administration’ resulted 
in 1134 potentially relevant documents. A consecutive refinement by document type 
revealed that ‘journal articles’ make up 54% of those publications, followed by 30% 
‘book reviews’. The rest of the publications consist of ‘proceedings paper’, ‘editorial 
material’, etc. Table 1 gives an overview of the top ten journals for the document type 
of ‘articles’. 
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Table 1: Information in Political Science and Public Administration 
Source Titles Record Count % of N=559 
Public Administration Review 66 11.8% 
American Political Science Review 31 5.6% 
American Journal of Political Science 28 5% 
Public Administration 24 4.3% 
Policy Studies Journal 21 3.8% 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 20 3.6% 
Journal of Politics 18 3.2% 
Canadian Public Administration 16 2.9% 
Political Research Quarterly 15 2.7% 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 13 2.3% 
Others (86 Journals) 307 54.8% 
Source: Web of Science (2012) 
As Table 1 shows, publications mainly concerned with the aspect of information are not 
concentrated on a few sources but are spread over a total of 96 scientific journals. How-
ever, most of the articles categorized as relevant were published in ‘Public Administra-
tion Review’. A further refinement was conducted aiming at filtering publications treat-
ing information in connection with politicians. These publications provided the basis for 
consecutively tracing additional work by using forward and backward citation maps in 
order to analyze these reference lists over a period of two generations.3 
Table 2 on the next page shows our selection of publications with a particular focus on 
legislators’ information need and use – in general and for decision-making purposes in 
particular. Publications are arranged according to whether they provide conceptual 
and/or empirical insights and are listed in a chronological order, starting with treatments 
from the late 1960s. Publications that provide literature overviews, such as from Pollitt 
(2006a), Bimber (1991) or Weiss (1997, 1998), were treated as conceptual works, since 
they help to draw conclusions about strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We start with a discussion of em-
pirical works and organize insights according to reform periods. Next, conceptual 
treatments are reviewed and are arranged according to the fundamental propositions 
they suggest for the study of politicians’ information behavior. Finally, we conclude by 
drawing some general implications for future research and by discussing potential re-
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Table 2: Publications Treating Politicians’ Information Need and Use 
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INFORMATION IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Publications providing empirical material may either be attributed to the period of the 
1970s and 1980s, when specialization and decentralization were at the forefront of con-
gressional reforms, or to the New Public Management (NPM) era, when the reorganiza-
tion of the public administration apparatus was accompanied by the credo of output and 
outcome measurement and its reporting to elected officials. 
The Use of Policy Information after U.S. Congressional Reforms 
Bimber (1991) provides an overview of the first period and summarizes the scholarly 
debate as one that was mainly divided over the importance of information and expertise 
to the work and policy output of U.S. Congress (Bimber, 1991, p. 589ff.). Advocates of 
the specialization and decentralization reforms within Congress aimed at bringing the 
information capacity and sophistication of the parliament closer to that of the executive 
branch of government. A lack of modern technology, insufficient staff and other inade-
quate resources were blamed for causing an ‘information gap’ and for restricting par-
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(Cohen, 1973). Schneier (1970), Schick (1976) and Jones (1976) disagreed with this 
view and challenge the idea that an increased availability of ‘objective information’ and 
an improved access to it would enhance legislators’ policy making capacity. They sug-
gest that the purpose of policy analysis for legislators is to provide evidence for what 
their political judgment tells them is correct. It is argued that what deters legislators 
from seeking intelligent information in an objective, goal-free sense is the institutional 
character of this law-producing body. Congressmen, as Schick puts it, “seem more con-
cerned about the distributive effects of public policies than about pro bono publico ben-
efit-cost ratios. Unlike the analyst who seeks to maximize aggregate national welfare, 
the legislator knows that it is someone’s welfare that is to be benefited” (Schick, 1976, 
p. 217, italics in original). 
Empirical studies of parliamentary decision-making accompanying this debate focused 
on the influence new information had on decision-making, on defining and categorizing 
information, they attempted to reveal relevant sources and analyzed the flow of infor-
mation within the parliament. Contributions come from Bradley (1973) and Weber 
(1977) who make a distinction between substantial policy information and political in-
formation about positions of other actors on pending decisions and about the potential 
impact on legislators’ reelection or career prospects (see also Sabatier & Whiteman, 
1985, p. 397). Zwier (1979, p. 34ff) shows that specialist legislators rely upon different 
information sources than nonspecialists. Whereas the former group uses many noncon-
gressional sources such as the executive branch and interest groups, the latter appear to 
be more dependent on their constituency and colleagues. 
Porter (1974) introduced a two-step communication model and showed that information 
flows from lobbyists and administrators to specialist legislators and committeemen, 
respectively, who in turn “retail” it to others in the parliament (Porter, 1974, p. 705).4 
Building on the work of Porter (1974), Sabatier & Whiteman (1985, p. 397ff.) add 
“staffs” of specialist legislators as an intermediary and suggest a three-stage-model of 
information flow. They stress the filtering position staff has within the legislative deci-
sion-making process. In addition, the authors show that policy information and political 
information follow different paths in order to reach legislators. 
Kingdon (1981) sheds light on legislators’ information search behavior. He observes 
that parliamentarians do not have much incentive to engage in an extensive search for 
information, given the sharp time constraints they face, the competition of many matters 
for their attention, and the disposition of legislators “to be not very concerned with 
many of the subjects before them” (Kingdon, 1981, p. 242). In an analogy to Cyert & 
March’s (1963, p. 120) “Behavioral Theory of the Firm”, Kingdon (1981, p. 228) por-
trays legislators’ information search behavior as “problemistic”; that is, they do not look 
for information unless they face a problem to which “simple decision rules” fail to pro-
vide a solution. In other words, a) if a pending decision does not imply a political prob-
lem with her district, b) if a legislator has a fixed opinion on the issue or c) if she has 
already established a voting history on that subject, there is no need to demand infor-
mation about it, Kingdon (1981, p. 230) claims. 
Lastly, based on an extensive study of empirical material, Leviton & Hughes (1981, p. 
533ff) identify five major clusters of variables that are consistently related to a higher 
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probability of policy information utilization. To be used, available information has to be 
relevant with respect to policy concerns. Although difficult to achieve, relevance is in-
creased the more available information addresses the policy-makers’ needs and the 
more timely it is reported. Second, the quality of communication between the producer 
of information and its end user increases the potential for use. The quality, in turn, 
seems to be higher in cases where communication between the actors occurs not sporad-
ically but frequently and where organizational hierarchy is low, thereby preventing the 
obstruction of valuable information. Third, to be used, available information must be 
recognized to be relevant for the matter at hand. Better comprehension and therefore 
higher probability of utilization can be achieved by highlighting the implications and 
recommendations particular information has for the policy at hand. Fourth, in order to 
be used, available information has to be credible. Credibility is affected by several con-
siderations, such as by comparisons with other available information, the individual 
intuition or knowledge about an issue, the credibility of the information producer as 
well as by the methodological quality and a professional presentation of reported infor-
mation. Lastly, using information in a political context requires its advocacy by the end 
user. It has been found that advocacy for information can be better achieved by involv-
ing potential users in the process of producing the information through regular consulta-
tions. 
The Use of Information in NPM Settings 
More recent empirical studies of information use are concerned by the respective conse-
quences NPM reforms exhibit on the politics-administration nexus. Although varying in 
their national differentiation, NPM reforms aim to improve the old-style Weberian 
(1978, p. 112ff.) conception of administrative action by suggesting shared responsibili-
ties between politics and the public administration with respect to strategic and opera-
tional decision-making authority (Schedler, 2003). To put it simply, NPM envisions the 
legislative branch to be responsible for providing the targeted outcomes whereas the 
executive branch is granted responsibility to decide on how these outcomes can be 
achieved most efficiently and effectively (Amstrong, 1985; Bowsher, 1985; Frank & 
D'Souza, 2004). In an NPM environment performance information is crucial. It is need-
ed to set targets in management contracts, to compare them with actual performance, to 
emphasize outputs and to focus on efficiency (Jansen, 2008, p. 169). Its conveyance to 
politics aims to compensate the democratically elected body for its permission to ‘let the 
managers manage’ and to disenthrall administration from its ‘black box’ image by in-
creasing transparency. In essence, performance measurement and management is ulti-
mately meant to influence decision-making in politics and the allocation of financial 
means to activities and programs (Curristine, 2005). 
Compared to the first period of research about politicians’ information behavior, most 
current studies focus exclusively on the particular type of performance information and 
do not include politicians’ behavior toward other kinds of information. In general, there 
is skepticism about the factual use of reported performance information by legislators 
(e.g., Bussmann, 1996, p. 313; Moynihan, 2005b, p. 204f; Pollitt, 2006a, p. 46ff; ter 
Bogt, 2004, p. 241). It is argued that performance measurement and performance man-
agement are activities by and for the executive branch of government and it “often ‘hits 
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a wall’ when it […] comes to the legislative or policy-making process” (Ho & Coates, 
2004, p. 31, emphasis in original). Since the political process is characterized by insta-
bility due to changing coalitions and value driven compromises, incrementalism and 
muddling through dominate political decision-making and prevent attempts of rationali-
zation (Bussmann, 1996, p. 313). Besides the very nature of the political process, there 
are also institutional elements which are claimed to account for the limited use of per-
formance information by legislators. It is argued that if legislature’s role – for example 
in the budget process – is limited, then politicians’ motivation to engage with perfor-
mance information and to use them for decision-making purposes can be expected to be 
rather low (Bourdeaux, 2008; Cunningham & Harris, 2005). Lastly, individual charac-
teristics such as the length of political experience and proficiency of a legislator could 
supplement the use of performance information (Askim, 2008). 
Some of the limited empirical insights we have on these issues stem from ter Bogt’s 
(2001, 2003, 2004) case studies and survey research on Dutch Aldermen – the top eche-
lon of Dutch councilors. Ter Bogt (2004, p. 222) suggests that the extent to which re-
ported performance information is used by politicians decreases the more politicized, 
complex, uncertain, and less measureable a policy field is. In such cases, legislators 
address different sources and other kinds of information in order to evaluate the perfor-
mance of managers, public programs, and organizations. Instead of referring to data in 
written reports, they prefer face-to-face encounters with civil servants in order to get 
richer information about concrete issues (ter Bogt, 2004, p. 228). In addition, ter Bogt 
(2001, p. 634f.) notes that politicians’ evaluation style is not primarily based on what 
‘we’ call performance information; that is, information on outputs and outcomes. He 
suggests that legislators’ style of performance appraisal is better characterized as “oper-
ations-conscious”; that is, a lot of attention is paid to activities and processes within the 
public administration, which are considered to be better indicators for a well-
functioning of the apparatus (ter Bogt, 2003). Overall, ter Bogt supports the view that 
politicians do not value the performance information reported to them and therefore 
make only limited use of it (ter Bogt, 2001, p. 631). 
Askim’s (2007) study of Norwegian local Councilors’ use of written performance in-
formation derives a different conclusion. Based on Barzelay (2003), Askim disaggre-
gates the decision-making process into a pre-decisional, a decisional, and a post-
decisional stage in order to derive the different functions performance information 
serves for legislators along this timeline. He shows that reported performance infor-
mation is used by legislators mostly in the pre-decisional and the post-decisional stage 
in order a) to identify problems and set them on the political agenda, b) to specify alter-
natives and c) to monitor the implementation of programs and policy initiatives, respec-
tively. In the decisional stage, however, written performance information is relatively 
less used in order d) to take a stand on a particular issue. Case documents provided by 
the administration as well as local party programs appear to be more influential in form-
ing legislators’ positions in this stage. Overall, Askim (2007, p. 464f) identifies two 
clusters in terms of levels of performance information utilization. First, utilization 
proved to be higher among legislators working with elderly care, administrative affairs, 
and educational affairs than among those concerned with cultural affairs, technical ser-
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vices, as well as planning and commercial development. Second, these differences 
among legislators of different policy fields turned out to be stable through the three 
stages of decision-making, except for those working with administrative affairs and 
technical services. For these legislators, performance information’s use increased during 
the course of decision-making stages. Askim (2007, p. 466; 2009, p. 34) notes that these 
and other findings seem to contradict those of ter Bogt, but abstains from a further elab-
oration of possible reasons. 
To our knowledge, the most recent empirical treatment is provided by Raudla (2012). 
Her focus is on the direct use of performance information in legislators’ budgetary deci-
sion-making. Six years after Pollitt’s (2006a) overview, Raudla (2012, p. 2) reconfirms 
that the empirical basis we have so far on this aspect is still limited. She (2012, p. 3ff) 
summarizes theoretical perspectives that underlie current analyses of legislators’ use of 
performance information. Thereby, Raudla finds propositions for and against the use of 
performance information by legislators for making budgeting decisions. 





Legislators pay attention to performance information in order to 
alleviate information asymmetry between the two branches of 
government. 
Askim (2008); Banks 
(1989) 
Legislators may be reluctant to apply performance information in 
order to make decisions about the allocation of resource because 
they lack trust in the information provided by the executive branch 
Bourdeaux (2008); Calvert 
(1985); Wang (2008) 
Organizational     
Learning Theory 
Legislators make use of available performance information in 
order to improve the quality of budgeting decisions. 
Willoughby & Melkers 
(2001) 
Legislators consult performance information in order to identify 
declining performance and to pint out gaps between intended and 
actual performance. 
Askim (2007); Melkers & 
Willoughby (2005) 
Theories of Political 
Behavior and      
Communication 
Politicians are more concerned with the future than the past; hence, 
they are more interested in the goals set than in applying perfor-
mance information for ex post evaluations of goal attainment.  
Askim (2008) 
Performance information is used selectively rather than systemati-
cally because of opportunistic and strategic reasons of legislators. 
Legislators from governing parties can be expected to highlight 
measures indicating success, while legislators of opposition parties 
point to failures.  
Moynihan (2005a); Patty 
(2009); Pollitt (2006b); 
Julnes & Holzer (2001) 
Theories of Political 
Budgetary Behavior 
Budgeting is a process driven more by political rationality than by 
economic rationality. Hence, various aspects ‘prevent’ the alloca-
tion of resources according to what performance information 
would suggest. 
Bendor, Taylor, & Van 
Gaalen (1987); Rubin 
(1993); Wildavsky (1966)  
However, based on eight semi-structured interviews with former members of the fi-
nance committee of the Estonian parliament Raudla (2012, p. 14) finds more support for 
those theoretical perspectives that are skeptical about the extent to which performance 
information has a direct impact on budgeting decisions or on the budget discourse. Ta-
ble 3 above depicts Raudla’s (2012) summary of relevant theoretical perspectives con-
cerning legislators’ performance information use and adds further exemplary work to 
each perspective. 
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In sum and in both periods, the study of parliamentary use of information is driven by 
reforms that led to an increased exposure of individual legislators to information of dif-
ferent kinds. Inquiries of the 1970s and 1980s focus mostly on the use of policy infor-
mation and evaluate the effects decentralization and specialization of U.S. Congress had 
thereon. More recent works are interested in the general use of performance information 
on administrative action. It is characteristic for both periods that the ultimate research 
interest lies on the impact information provided to legislators has on particular deci-
sions. Overall, overwhelming evidence of legislators’ little value of available infor-
mation exist alongside patchy insights of its factual and direct use for decision-making 
purposes. We argue that a turn to conceptual treatments of human information behavior 
– including works from allied scholarly fields – may help understand contradictory find-
ings and set the course for a more systematic analysis of politicians’ information behav-
ior. 
INFORMATION IN CONCEPTUAL TREATMENTS 
Publications providing conceptual foundations for the study of legislators’ information 
behavior are based on an actor-centered paradigm. It requires the clarification of three 
basic questions: first, why does an individual need for information arise at all?; second, 
what is the basis of politicians’ policy positions and how does information fit therein?; 
and lastly, what do we mean by using information? We have selected these aspects for 
further elaboration, because they may help us to conceptually grasp the “things” to 
which we aim to attach the empirical “facts”, as Sartori (1970, p. 1039) has put it. 
Human Information Behavior Occurs in Context 
Performance information supplied by the public administration serves a purpose. From 
its perspective, this type of information is first and foremost meant to provide the basis 
for performance appraisals by politicians. The underlying assumption is that infor-
mation on these dimensions serves politicians’ need to do so. However, for politicians, 
this kind of information is secondary when it comes to how public managers, programs, 
and organization are to be evaluated (ter Bogt, 2004). This is not because of a bad un-
derstanding about how this has to be carried out but because of a different one. Appar-
ently, politicians’ need for appraisal is much better served by process related infor-
mation, whereas information on outputs and outcomes is used for various other purpos-
es along the decision-making process (Askim, 2007). Instead of focusing on the analysis 
of a particular kind of information – such as performance information – considerations 
from the field of information science suggest that the utilization of any kind of infor-
mation and human information behavior in general are better understood by shifting the 
research focus toward the actors and their context. 
Building on Wilson (1981, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2006a, 2006b) and on his widely 
acknowledged conception of human information behavior (Bawden, 2006; Cronin, 
2001; Jarvelin & Wilson, 2003), it is claimed that research which aims to understand the 
actual use of a particular kind of information should focus on the end user and on the 
context wherein the individual information behavior occurs. This notion rests upon the 
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fundamental proposition that a need for information does not arise out of a vacuum but 
is induced by a particular situation in which a person finds herself. An information need 
is not to be conceived as a primary need. When people look for information, they try to 
satisfy personal needs of a more basic nature (Wilson, 1999, p. 252), such as physiolog-
ical, affective, and cognitive needs (Wilson, 2006a, p. 663). Because the situations in 
which information is sought and used are social situations, these basic needs in turn can 
be claimed to arise out of the roles a particular person fills in social life and within a 
particular environment. One of these roles might be the professional role and the corre-
sponding set of activities and responsibilities – all embedded in some organizational 
setting, where earnings or other satisfactions are pursued and sanctions avoided. 
In essence, individuals’ and hence politicians’ information behavior is to be conceived 
as a consequence of particular circumstances, evoking basic needs that require satisfac-
tion (Wilson, 1999, p. 251). Multiple options might be available to reach that goal out of 
which the acquisition of information is only one among a whole host of possibilities. By 
the same token, it is not to be assumed that conventionally defined performance infor-
mation are the only kind of information on which politicians ground their performance 
judgments. Rather, a myriad of different types of information may complement or even 
substitute another in order to satisfy an individual need for appraisal. Surveying politi-
cians about the overall use of one particular kind of information is too general an ap-
proach, because it misses to grasp this plurality of opportunities actors have and it lacks 
the comparative perspective on performance information. 
As Wilson notes, his model is a ‘macro-model’ or a model of the ‘gross information 
seeking behavior’ which suggests how information needs may arise in general and their 
dependents on the context (Wilson, 1999, p. 252). However, for the analysis of the con-
crete information need of a politician, we require an approach for the ‘micro-moment’ 
of how particular situations evoke information needs. 
Kagan (1972, p. 54) proposed to conceive the concept of information need as a “cogni-
tive representation of a future goal that is desired.” However defined, information need 
remains a subjective concept, an experience that occurs only in the mind of a person and 
is beyond direct observation. One obvious way of operationalizing information needs is 
therefore to look for how the actual demands for information change; that is, an analysis 
of the different kinds of information or information sources used depending on the sit-
uation (Brittain, 1970, p. 3). To our knowledge, this is the way empirical studies of poli-
ticians information behavior have addressed the issue so far. However, exploring partic-
ular information needs means, in addition, addressing the fundamental question of why 
an individual decides to seek information, what purposes she believes it will serve and 
how the information will actually be used when received. An examination of infor-
mation demands solely is thus rather unsatisfactory, because it cannot provide answers 
on these questions 
From a theoretical perspective, the question of why people tend to look for information 
can either be tackled from an ‘objective’ or a ‘subjective’ point of view (Case, 2008, p. 
72ff).5 From the former perspective, information needs are thought to be relatively fixed 
and assumed to stem from some sort of uncertainty. Purposeful thinking, advocates of 
this camp suggest, leads to information seeking and its instrumental use to solve an ex-
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isting problem and to reduce uncertainty, respectively (e.g., Atkin, 1972, 1973). Ap-
proaches belonging to the subjective camp originate from semiotics; the study of lan-
guage and other cultural products as systems of signs that convey meaning by way of 
established conventions. From this perspective, information needs and subsequent 
search are contingent upon how a person perceives a particular situation. Subsequent 
information search and utilization are then considered as attempts to ‘make sense’ of 
that situation (Artandi, 1973, p. 243f). 
Brenda Dervin’s Sense-Making-Approach offers, according to Case (2008, p. 75), the 
most ambitious attempt to explain the origins of information needs. The concept consist 
of a situation, out of which information needs arise; a gap that emerges as a difference 
between the existing situation and the desired situation (e.g., uncertainty reduction); a 
corresponding outcome or, in other words, the consequences of the sense-making pro-
cess; finally, the bridge entails some means of closing the gap between exiting situation 
and the envisioned outcome. From this perspective, information needs are conceived as 
individual attempts to answer questions in ones’ head and to make sense of a current, 
‘gappy’ situation (Dervin, 1983, p. 170; Savolainen, 2006, p. 1120). This may be a quite 
rational attempt to solve a problem or to reduce uncertainty, but may also be triggered 
by a vague feeling of unease or simply by anxiety about a current situation. 
In sum, and as Wilson (1999, p. 253f) comments, Dervin’s approach allows to analyze 
individual information behavior in context. In addition, it unfolds its strengths for the 
study of politicians’ information behavior because of its methodological consequences. 
The approach prompts a way of questioning that attempts to reveal the nature of the 
problematic situation, the extent to which information serves to bridge the gap, and the 
nature of the outcomes from the use of information. 
Ideology, Interest and Information as the Basis of Policy Positions 
Askim’s (2007) strategy to respect the context of legislators’ information use and to 
analyze the extent of performance information utilization along the decision-making 
process represents a promising approach which clearly evidences that one kind of in-
formation, namely performance information, is considered to varying degrees and for 
different purposes depending on the particular situation. However, we think that the 
shift of the research focus away from the examination of particular kinds of information 
could be more radical in order to gain even more insights about politicians’ information 
behavior. We propose to climb the ‘ladder of abstraction’, as Sartori (1970, p. 1040f) 
noted, to create a more inclusive concept of the situation than decision-making stages. It 
has to be one that allows the identification of the reasons for the varying extent infor-
mation use and provides at the same time the possibility to hypothesize about how in-
formation is put in place by politicians when actually used. It therefore seems advisable 
to consult treatments that try to understand information’s proper place within the entire 
phenomenon of individual decision making of politicians, before information as a par-
ticular aspect of interest is uncoupled and analyzed in more detail. 
In the end of the 1970s, Carol Weiss began a sequence of seminal articles and devel-
oped conceptual ideas which, according to Pollitt (2006a, p. 43), are the most cited 
within the research area of politicians’ information need and use and are still relevant to 
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date (Weiss, 1979, 1997, 1998). Weiss conceives the formation of policy positions of 
politicians as the resultant of a complex interplay of three sets of forces: their ideolo-
gies, their interests, and the information they have.6 Weiss (1983, p. 221) notes the fact 
that when different groups of actors engage in discussions and bargaining to determine 
the final shape of potential policies, other forces come into play. It is well known that 
negotiations within and across organizations as well as in the political arena are affected 
by a variety of structural and procedural influences; such as hierarchy, specialization, 
fragmentation of issues, reliance on routines, control of information resources, and so 
forth (cf. Weiss, 1983, p. 221, FN 4 for various treaties on these aspects).7 Nevertheless, 
Weiss holds that, “the content of each group’s policy positions, as these are advanced 
initially and modified in the course of negotiations, is based on the interplay of ideolo-
gy, interests, and information as the group interprets them” (1983, p. 221, italics in 
original). 
For Weiss, ideology encompasses a broad range: philosophy, principles, values, politi-
cal orientations. Ideology may imply for her any relatively coherent political predisposi-
tion as well as vague proclivities. In essence, at ideology’s core are ethical and moral 
values, which generate general dispositions toward particular policies. These disposi-
tions come into being because political ideology represents an “evaluative-descriptive-
prescriptive account of the political world” that is “normative, ethical, moral in tone and 
content” (Lane, 1962a, p. 15; 1962b, p. 173f). Although people’s ideologies may be 
loosely integrated, they represent a basis for position taking, because they provide an 
emotionally charged normative orientation toward an issue. In other words, although 
most of the people do not have comprehensive ideologies that provide a ready-made 
answer to every problematic situation, they have general predispositions like ‘govern-
ment should not overregulate private enterprises’ or ‘the environment should be protect-
ed’ which give them a clear direction to work out their ideological position when deal-
ing with concrete issues. 
Interest is primarily defined as self-interest and encompasses, for example, the fact that 
politicians strive for reelection, their ambitions for higher authority positions, their ea-
gerness for power and influence. Interests represent “the stuff of politics” (Weiss, 1983, 
p. 224f). The play of interests dominates our thinking of policymaking. Very often, it 
takes place at center stage and is disseminated by the media. But it also goes on back-
stage, in the offices of agencies and at meetings of policy actors. Elected representatives 
have a stake in the configuration a particular policy takes. The ‘electoral imperative’ is a 
familiar concept for a long time now (Mayhew, 1974): Legislators as a particular group 
of policy actors care about voters’ preferences and the effects of a decision on their 
chances for reelection, their relationships to fellow party members and other parliamen-
tarians, the consequences for chairmanship within parliamentary committees, etc. A 
familiar sociological proposition is that people tend to believe in ideologies that are in 
line with their self-interest. Findings with this respect are well-documented and summa-
rized under the maxim ‘where you stand depends upon where you sit’ (Weiss, 1983, p. 
237). 
Information represents the factual assumptions, on which policy positions are based 
(Weiss, 1983, p. 225ff). Information of any kind comes from many sources: from the 
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politicians’ own parties or organizations and their routines and structures or from inter-
est groups located outside these structures; it is conveyed through formal and informal 
channels or systems; it may originate from the own experience, from friends, neighbors, 
the media, or flow from a variety of other sources. Information supplied by the public 
administration fits somewhere in this “informational mélange” (Weiss, 1983, p. 228). 
However, in politics too, information does not exist as such, but has bearing on policy 
positions by being embedded in an explanatory framework. Depending on the policy 
issue of interest, a particular model usually suggests a causal relationship in the sense 
that, changes in a variable X will lead to changes in an outcome Y, simply put. 
The point is that, these three forces allow operationalizing the concept of the context 
and to hypothesize about the likely potential for information to enter individual deci-
sion-making in a substantial way. Depending on the situation in which the politician 
finds herself and the decision to be made, respectively, the influence of each force – 
information, interests, ideology – on the formation of a policy position varies. The po-
tential for information to be considered mainly depends on three different interactions 
(Weiss, 1983, pp. 229-239): The extent to which the information supplied is compatible 
with prior information or with settled knowledge about ‘how the world works’; the way 
in which available information alters a politician’s perception of which policy position 
is in her interest; and lastly, whether existing information is supportive or challenging to 
politicians’ basic policy predispositions and her ideology, respectively. This so-called 
‘ideology-interest-information framework’ is used as a diagnostic scheme for identify-
ing the configuration of these factors in a particular policy situation. The framework 
allows developing, as Weiss (1983, p. 241ff) proposes, hypotheses about the likely ef-
fects of information under different circumstances. 
In essence, one could claim that all potential situations a politician finds herself differ 
according to the degree to which ideology and interests harmoniously suggest how to 
decide on a particular issue. For example, at one extreme, we can think of situations 
where a politician’s ideological commitments are powerful and interests arrayed on one 
side of the issue. In such situation one could hypothesize that new information incom-
patible with the current constellation will have a small chance to influence what a politi-
cian ‘already knows’ and hence, will rather not alter the position her ideology and inter-
est harmoniously suggest on that issue. We may call these kinds of constellations Situa-
tion 0. In Situation 0 the world and the causal relationships therein are clear to a person, 
no ambiguities exist, and decisions are usually made ‘in passing’ since ideology and 
interest tell the politician how to position in no uncertain terms. This is not to say that 
all politicians make the same decision on a given problem but that it is clear where a 
particular politician will stand, since we know where she sits. 
At the other extreme, it is possible to think of policy issues where a politician finds her 
ideology and interests in conflict and where only new information can help to solve her 
dilemma. In such a situation she ‘does not already know’ what to decide on a particular 
issue. The ideology she believes in and the interests she represents fail to provide a 
harmonious orientation, so that we may hypothesize that she will likely welcome new 
information that helps her to take a position. These kinds of constellations could be la-
beled Situation 1. In Situation 1 the world and the relationships therein are ambiguous 
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and confusing. This prevents a politician from easily taking a position and makes her 
receptive for ideas or information that help her recast the nature of the problem. It is not 
clear where she will stand, because she does not exactly know where she is sitting. 
In sum, applying the ‘ideology-interest-information framework’ provides a more inclu-
sive analytical approach that covers, for example, a differentiation among timely de-
fined decision-making stages. The achieved generality comes without any loss of preci-
sion, since, the remaining differentiates – decision situations located between the poles 
of Situation 0 and Situation 1 – are precise. No matter how all-embracing the conceptu-
alization obtained appears to be, it still bears a traceable relation to a collection of spe-
cifics – ideology, interests, and interest – that can empirically be tested (Sartori, 1970, p. 
1041). 
The Use of Information 
The situation thus defined and within which a politician finds herself is not only held 
accountable for shaping her information needs and staking out information’s general 
potential to influence positioning, but is also claimed to affect the way available infor-
mation is actually used. The focus of current literature prevents conclusions about this 
aspect of politicians’ information behavior. In general, current studies with substantial 
empirical components credit their outmost attention to the extent to which a particular 
kind of information is reported to be used by politicians and take it implicitly for grant-
ed that this information, say performance information, is used according to its designat-
ed role – namely, for the evaluation of an agency’s or a program’s performance. 
The use of performance information by politicians for performance evaluation purposes 
is only one type of use and corresponds to, what Weiss (1979, p. 427) has called, the 
‘Problem-Solving Model’ or what Caplan (1976) has named as the ‘engineering model’; 
a pending decision implies that information provides empirical evidence and conclu-
sions that help to take a position on a particular issue or to solve a problem at hand. 
However, there are other understandings of what ‘using information’ may actually come 
to mean. In sharp contrast to this understanding stands the ‘Political Model’ of infor-
mation use. For example, in Situation 0 constellations where strong ideological com-
mitments exist and interests array on the same side of the issue, positions that politicians 
take are claimed to be highly predetermined and information’s potential to shift such a 
position can be considered to be rather low. However, this is not to say that provided 
information is not used at all. In such circumstance information is likely to be used, for 
example, as “ammunition for the side that finds its conclusions congenial and support-
ive” (Weiss, 1979, p. 429), and probably denied or disputed by the other side. 
The potential of analytic information to be used these ways has been acknowledge by 
different authors (e.g., Davidson, 1976; Knorr, 1977; Lindlom & Cohen, 1979; 
Wildavsky, 1979). By studying the role of policy analysis in congressional decision-
making Whiteman (1985) provided empirical evidence on this phenomenon and identi-
fied three types of information use by politicians. He notes that “what primarily differ-
entiates the three types of use is the strength of the policy-maker’s commitment to spe-
cific solutions to policy problems” (Whiteman, 1985, p. 298ff). Substantive use of in-
formation is observed in the absence of strong commitments to specific solutions. In 
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such policy situations available information is used by legislators in the search for a 
satisfactory issue positioning. Elaborative use describes the utilization of analytic in-
formation in extending and refining the components of a position, which is already en-
vironed by a commitment to a specific approach to the policy issue. In cases where leg-
islators have made strong commitments to a well-defined position, policy analysis is 
used strategically in the process of “reinforcing or confirming the wisdom of individual 
judgments regarding current legislative approaches of general policy questions” 
(Whiteman, 1985, p. 302). In addition, Whiteman observed that these different types of 
use were linked to the degree of conflict over an issue in the sense that greater conflict 
resulted in more strategic use of information. Substantive and elaborative utilization are 
less common but consequential in low conflict environments, where legislators try to 
arrive at or modify issue positioning. 
Other authors have developed different categories for basically the same ideas (see 
Leviton & Hughes, 1981, p. 528f for examples). In sum, they highlight an important 
aspect that has been out of focus so far – namely, that the term ‘use’ is rather mislead-
ing, since it attempts to describe something that in fact is much better characterized as 
‘interplay’ between an available information and a situation bounded individual. Rein 
(1980, p. 366) therefore holds that information “has no meaning independent of its use.” 
He is essentially arguing what has already been noted by Dervin; that is, that the use of 
information is dependent upon the gap an individual politician perceives in a given situ-
ation. This approach does not assume a ‘neutrally’ acting legislator but individuals be-
having according to how they see and interpret things and people around them. Their 
worldview fundamentally shapes the definition of a particular policy problem and, logi-
cally consistent, can be claimed to alter the ultimate use of available information. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICIANS’ INFORMATION BEHAVIOR 
Research’s interest in legislators’ information behavior is not new. It was a topic of 
heated debate decades ago, when reforms aimed at enhancing U.S. Congress’ capacity 
to make informed policy decisions. There is an agreement that after these reforms, as 
Bimber (1991, p. 590) concludes, Congress was indeed better equipped with infor-
mation and expertise. However, more information did neither alter the policy process 
nor did the availability of expertise guarantee its use by legislators. To us, current re-
search on the availability and utilization of performance information resembles very 
much the reform debate of the 1970s and 1980s, except for the kind of information that 
is of main interest nowadays. With this respect, it is surprising that treatments of politi-
cians’ behavior toward performance information do not build more systematically on 
existing concepts and empirical results. 
General Implications for Future Research 
This paper aimed at drawing an outline of the knowledge we have about politicians’ 
information need and use. Essentially, we argue that existing and sometimes contradic-
tory results could be better appreciated, if attempts to understand politicians’ behavior 
toward performance information would be based on research designs that consider the 
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implications of context, the information-decision nexus in a political environment, and 
the possibility of using available information in non-substantive ways. Reorienting re-
search according to these aspects has implications on what traditionally has been under-
stood by performance information. 
First, the reform debate of the 1970s and 1980s highlights that the problems of using 
expertise and policy analysis were seldom connected to its quality or quantity. Rather, 
the value of the information for legislators varied according to the political context it 
was provided (Bimber, 1991, p. 586). The inclusion of context in the study of politi-
cians’ information behavior is crucial. It conceptualizes individual information needs as 
second order needs which arise out of a particular policy situation a politician faces. 
Information of whatever kind is therefore to be treated as only one mean toward a spe-
cific end. Performance information can be claimed to compete with other means of goal 
attainment or to supplement them, but it is hard to treat it in isolation from context. 
Askim’s (2007) disaggregation of the policy cycle in different decision stages is an in-
dication for the claim that the relevance of performance information varies depending 
on the situation. It qualifies conclusions suggesting that performance information is not 
valued by politicians and used only rarely. Attempts to understand the use, nonuse or 
even misuse of performance information need therefore to address how politicians per-
ceive the decision situations they face, what questions they try to answer therein, and 
elaborate on the goals these actors try to achieve by using performance information. The 
inclusion of context implies a shift from the analysis of particular kinds of information 
toward the context-bounded individual. 
Second, the ‘ideology-interest-information’ framework provides a useful approach to 
operationalize that context and the policy situations politicians face, respectively. It 
acknowledges that information is only one factor on which politicians base their deci-
sions. By integrating the influence of ideology and interests, the framework allows in-
corporating the political rationale which mediates the information-decision nexus and 
conditions the claim that performance information has per se little potential to influence 
individual decision-making in a political context. In other words, in policy situations, 
where individual predispositions of politicians are claimed to be strong, information that 
is incompatible with the individual constellation of ideology and interest can indeed be 
expected to have a low potential to influence the outcome of individual decisions. How-
ever, if we think of policy situations where ideology and interests cause a dilemma for a 
legislator in the sense that individual predispositions fail to provide a clear issue-
position, available performance information would have at least a hypothetical potential 
to orient politicians’ decision outcomes. 
Third, as Feldman & March (1981) have argued, information is embedded in social 
norms that make it highly symbolic. As most of the empirical treatments show, infor-
mation of whatever kind is only rarely used in patterns envisioned by simple rational 
decision theory; that is, in a substantive way in order to make ‘rational’ decisions. Ra-
ther, available information was observed to be used by politicians mostly in a strategic 
way (Whiteman, 1985). Why should this be different for the case of performance infor-
mation? Besides highlighting the boundary conditions for performance information to 
be used in a substantive way, Weiss’ (1983) framework allows understanding the vari-
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ous other purposes performance information supplied by the public administration may 
serve in a political context. 
This shift in the focus of analysis implies, lastly, a fundamentally different understand-
ing of performance information. Conceiving politicians as need-driven and goal-
oriented information users in particular policy situations requires that the definition of 
what pieces of data provide information about a manager’s, public program’s or organi-
zation’s performance is within the meaning of the individual, or at least within the 
meaning of the group of politicians. The conventional claim that performance infor-
mation refers to systematic information about outputs and outcomes basically presumes 
that performance is to be evaluated based on results, efficiency and effectiveness. Ter 
Bogt’s (2001, 2003) studies on the evaluation style of politicians suggests that these are 
not the primary criteria along which politicians judge performance. Rather, they seem to 
focus on dimensions that report on the various aspects of the functioning of the organi-
zation and the manager. From this perspective – and to put it simply – studies that de-
fine performance information conventionally ‘necessarily’ arrive to the conclusion that 
instruments reporting on outputs and outcomes are rarely used to evaluate performance. 
In this light, results showing that legislators do use written performance information and 
previously considered as contradictory to existing insights (see Askim, 2007, p. 466; 
Askim, 2009, p. 34) become compatible, since they evidence that performance infor-
mation is used by politicians for different purposes – for example, to identify problems 
and set them on the political agenda, to specify alternatives, and to monitor the imple-
mentation of programs and policy initiatives (Askim, 2007, p. 458ff). 
Practical Research Strategy Implications 
Aside from these general implications for future research, we want to put forward prac-
tical research strategy implications concerning the relevant unit of analysis, the nature 
of the cases to be studied as well as the characteristics of expedient research methods.  
As empirical studies from both research periods show, lobbyists, staffers, and specialist 
legislators act as knowledge brokers and ‘filter’ information of all kinds before key 
takeaways are communicated to other politicians. With respect to future research on 
performance information use, one could therefore ask whether we should continue to 
focus on individual politicians as the relevant unit of observation or rather focus on 
groups of people, such as a politician and her staff or on groups of politicians. This fo-
cus would help us to illuminate how information finds its way through the political are-
na; that is, to identify the ‘structures’ of various communication flows between front-
benchers and back-benchers, specialist and non-specialist legislators, or between politi-
cians and staffers – all affecting in one way or another the content of any kind of infor-
mation and its potential use. 
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We think that there are at least three reasons why future research should stick to the 
individual politician as the relevant unit of analysis. First, studies from the 1970s and 
1980s do focus on groups and already provide a good deal of knowledge about the flow 
of information among the various actors and actor groups involved in the entire parlia-
mentary decision-making process (see Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985, pp. 395-401, 413-
415 for a review of those studies and conclusions): For example, we know from these 
studies that legislators heavily rely on cues from specialized colleagues; that these spe-
cialist legislators are substantially involved in setting the agenda and specifying policy 
alternatives in committees; that the legislative staff can, overall, be considered as the 
most important source of information for specialist legislators, but that staff influence 
depends on the structure of its resources; that nonspecialists have more contact with 
external sources, such as administrative agencies and interest groups; that all legislators 
consult different sources in order to obtain ‘policy information’ compared to ‘political 
information’; and that the most important criteria for selecting sources of policy infor-
mation are the source’s accessibility, and its ability to provide concise, relevant infor-
mation in a timely manner. We doubt that a refocus of research activities on groups will 
bring more to light for the case of performance information than what is already known 
for the broader category of policy information. 
Second, as one might argue, the filtering and transformation of information, which is 
propelled by a variety of structural and procedural influences of groups, necessarily 
results in biased information for the individual political decision maker. One can there-
fore claim that observing an individual’s information behavior underestimates the factu-
al use of performance information; since hierarchy, specialization, fragmentation of 
issues, reliance on routines, control of information resources, and so forth cause distor-
tions. Hence, looking at groups would much more reflect the ‘real’ extent of perfor-
mance information use. There are convincing formal arguments suggesting that this 
might be an erroneous belief. Basically, the core of those arguments holds that distor-
tions in the ‘informational reservoir’ to which an individual has access become already 
manifest on the group level. In a seminal article, Calvert (1985) has shown that political 
principals with bias look for information and opinions that come from sources with sim-
ilar biases. The logic is straightforward: even though neutral advice and ‘unfiltered’ 
information may be available, a politician chooses to consult advisors and information 
which are biased toward her own predispositions, because they are more likely to be 
effective in affecting her final decision (Calvert, 1985, p. 551). This ‘demand side’ cal-
culus of biased information acquisition has recently been complemented by Patty’s 
(2009) ‘supply side’ argument of biased information provision. Being aware of the poli-
tician’s preferences concerning policy options, even unbiased advisors bias their “in-
formation collection in a manner that confirms the political principal’s ex ante bias” 
(Patty, 2009, p. 386, italics in original). Voluntarily biased information provision by 
advisors is based on a two-pronged logic: The pursuit of unbiased information is coun-
terproductive for the advisor, because, on the one hand, it frequently does not have an 
effect on the politician’s choice of which policy option to choose, but, on the other 
hand, does lower the quality with which the final policy chosen is implemented. In sum, 
we have good reasons for future research to avoid a less parsimonious group level ap-
proach, if the distortions it thereby seeks to counter do not vanish. 
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Lastly, studying groups of people is clearly directed toward investigating the ‘infor-
mation-seeking behavior’ of politicians and not their information needs. It is legitimate 
to focus on this dimension and to derive more pragmatic conclusions concerning the 
design of information systems and its development in light of existing communication 
structures. This approach may reveal insights with respect to the efficiency of infor-
mation systems or their effectiveness – e.g., how fast can they provide responses in 
what quality? However, “such studies may never address the central question of ‘infor-
mation need’, that is, why the user decides to seek information, what purpose he be-
lieves it will serve and to what use it is actually put when received” (Wilson, 2006a, p. 
662). 
Another concrete research design issue that is closely related to the relevant unit of 
analysis concerns the nature of the cases we choose to study. Since we know that politi-
cians have varying issue interests, the question arises whether we should consider poli-
ticians’ ‘average’ decision behavior or focus only on their behavior related to subjects 
of great importance to them. Analyzing ‘average’ decision behavior, as existing studies 
in both research periods demonstrate, can reveal the overall popularity of particular in-
formation sources, provide the relative frequency with which an information source is 
consulted, inform us about the direction and the intensity of communication flows, and 
may come up with other, more general and rather ‘structural’ insights. But because in-
formation behavior is highly contextual, this approach may fall short of grasping the 
dynamics a concrete policy situation induces on the goals to be attained, the individual 
information needs which arise therefrom, and the role particular information may play 
for a politician to attain those goals. It seems more promising for future research to con-
centrate on particular or concrete decisions and try to infer from those cases insights that 
help explain why certain information sources are preferred while others are used less 
frequently, why the flow of communication among actors takes on a particular structure, 
and so on. However, this does not necessarily imply that we should confront politicians 
only with subjects important to them. It only means that we should not ask haphazardly. 
With respect to appropriate research methods, this actor-centered paradigm of infor-
mation behavior requires future research to apply extremely case sensitive data-
gathering techniques. For example, Dervin’s (1983) Sense-Making-Approach offers an 
interview method for revealing how politicians perceive a particular policy situation, 
what they define as ‘gappy’ or problematic therein, and how available information may 
serve to bridge that gap. The approach allows the researcher to enter the realm of inten-
sive interviewing (Case, 2008, p. 214) and to gather in-depth information about phe-
nomena which are very much subjective in nature. At the same time, this method sacri-
fices a considerable potential to generalize findings. 
One way to enlarge this potential could be to embed Dervin’s interview approach in a 
quasi-experimental design (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Weiss’ (1983) ‘ideology-interest-
information framework’ represents a promising opportunity to frame the basic experi-
mental conditions. In a simple setting, participants would be confronted with a ‘Situa-
tion 0’ or ‘Situation 1’ scenario. Different kinds of information could be made available 
for review – on a so called ‘story board’ or a computer monitor (Case, 2008, p. 200) –, 
before an individual decision about the policy issue would be made. Embedded in this 
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main method, but sequentially after the experimental part, the researcher could conduct 
her interview with a special focus on the dimensions of interest but based on the specific 
policy decision presented.8 
Instead of creating a static picture of politicians’ preferences for particular kinds of in-
formation, systems or sources, the experimental part of such a ‘concurrent nested strate-
gy’ (Creswell, 2003, p. 218f) would confront a participating politician with a specific 
decision problem in order to systematically observe, analyze and compare her infor-
mation behavior with that of others handling the same or another problem. The idea is 
not to make statistical generalizations for the population of politicians. The quasi-
experimental part is rather useful to make theoretical generalizations (Webster & Sell, 
2007, p. 190ff); to characterize basic mechanisms that are at work when politicians con-
sider information in particular decision situations. Ideally constructed, these scenarios 
would represent extremes with respect to the degree to which ideology and interests 
harmoniously suggest how to position. However, the approach’s strength could be its 
ability to highlight the boundaries the political rational sets for the use of information. 
From our point of view, the interview nested in the quasi-experimental approach is vital 
for the main goal of explaining politicians’ information behavior in these two polar situ-
ations. It should therefore be designed to capture politicians’ view of the problematic 
(gappy) situations. It should aim at empirically characterizing and apprehending the 
information needs politicians have, when facing such a context, the extent to which in-
formation serves to bridge the gap, and the nature of the outcomes from the use of in-
formation. Mapping politicians’ perceptions and arguments in different situations, con-
trasting them with the observed behavior, and making a comparison within and among 
experimental groups could allow future research to shift toward the functions and pur-
poses available information serves for politicians given a particular context. 
In sum, such a design is meant to take the potential influence of ‘politics’ seriously. The 
decision problems presented to the participating politicians require weighing politically 
salient values. They would be a constitutive feature of the study and would allow to take 
the end user of performance information – the individual politician – as the starting 
point of analysis; that is, to examine from the very beginning how constellations of ide-
ology and interests drive the subjective definition of the decision problem, frame the 
subsequent aspects of information behavior, and shape the decision ultimately taken. 
NOTES 
 
1 There is no clear understanding, neither in praxis nor in academia, about the meaning 
of performance information (Siegel & Summermatter, 2008). Our working definition 
therefore refers to core dimensions of performance. 
2 Science Citation Index Expanded (1899-present), Social Sciences Citation Index 
(1898- present), Arts & Humanities Citation Index (1975- present), Conference Pro-
ceedings Citation Index- Science (1990- present), Conference Proceedings Citation 
Index - Social Science & Humanities (1990- present). 
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3 The records that directly cite or are directly cited by the target record are the first 
generation, records citing records that cite the target record and records cited by rec-
ords cited by the target record are the second generation, etc. 
4 This two-stage model of information flow and the possibility of lobbyist groups to 
influence the political agenda was later formalized by Austen-Smith (1993). 
5 However, from these two basic approaches different middle range theories and mod-
els of information behavior were developed and are comprehensively summarized by 
Fisher, Erdelez & McKechnie (2009). 
6 This information-processing model of decision-making is formalized by Sylvan, 
Goel, & Chandrasekaran (1990). 
7 In accordance with organization theorists like Herbert Simon and James March deci-
sion making is conceived in a broader sense and encompasses not only the final se-
lection among various alternatives but also the preceding activity of identifying the 
issue worth of attention, setting goals, and designing suitable courses of action 
(March, 1994, p. 23; Simon, 1992, p. 32). 
8 For design guidance, one can consult the literature on consumer behavior, which 
includes a great number of attempts at using experiments to understand how people 
look for and use information when faced with a purchasing decision (e.g., Hauser, 
Urban, & Weinberg, 1993 cited in Case, 2008, p. 199). The idea to combine the ex-
perimental approach with an interview comes from experimental psychology, where 
researchers are not only interested in determining the aggregate effects of an experi-
mental situation but also the individual perception that might have produced those 
effects. Helpful advice for how interview questions should be framed within such a 
setting is already available (e.g., Kahn, 1991; Merton & Kendall, 1946). 
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